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PARENTAL RIGHTS
AND STATE EDUCATION
Joel S. Moskowitz*
Little more than 100 years ago, arguing that parents have a primary and inalienable right to direct the intellectual and moral upbringing of their children would have been akin to arguing for the
right of parents to clothe them. The role' of the state was merely to
facilitate the performance of the parental duty to prepare the child for
a productive place in society by providing state-supported schools' to
which the parent might delegate the child's education should such be
2
desired.
That the conflicting parental and state interests in control of the
child were so balanced was more than an unconsciously followed
folkway bequeathed to us by unsophisticated ancestors. It was not
unusual for courts to remark that this parental right was a democratic
3
freedom:
Law-givers in all free countries, and, with few exceptions, in despotic governments, have deemed it wise to leave the education and
nurture of the children of the State to the direction of the parent or
guardian. This is, and ever has been, the spirit of our free institutions.
* Deputy Attorney General, State of California; B.A., 1967, J.D., 1970, University
of California (Los Angeles). Mr. Moskowitz is the author of LAW IN THE SCHOOL-A
GUIDE FOR CALIFORNIA TEACHERS, PARENTS AND STUDENTS (2d ed. 1975). The opinions

expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of his office.
1. Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1,4 (1955).
In 1647, Massachusetts required each town with 50 households to support a school.
Massachusetts,11 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 592, 594 (1974).
2. Concerning the decline of the in loco parentis and parens patriae doctrines, to
the extent they are based on such delegation, see note 119 infra.
3. Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875). This theme was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in The Universal Declarationof Human Rights where it
was declared that "[p] arents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that
shall be given to their children." G.A. Res. 217 (111], Art. 26(3) (1948).
At common law, this right of the parent was more the right of the father. School
Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578, 579 (1909). While interesting
observations could be made concerning the predisposition of courts to award custody
of children to the mother should the family break up, yet continuing to recognize the
primary paternal control while the family is together, see Griston v. Stousland, 186
Misc. 201, 60 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1946), for the purposes of this article it is
assumed that the wishes of the parents do not conflict.

623

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50". 623, 1975

The right to raise one's own children was considered not only the
right of a free individual, but also sound educational policy. Society
had not yet reached the state where the virtues spawned by the industrial revolution-efficiency and standardization-had been transposed from their role as a necessity in mass production to a byproduct (and sometimes a doctrine) of mass education. A court could
4
in all earnestness state:
[T] he policy of our law has ever been to recognize. . . that the [parent's] natural affections and superior opportunities of knowing the
physical and mental capabilities and future prospects of his child, will
insure the adoption of that course which will most effectually promote
the child's welfare.
The right to raise one's children, like many common law rights, also
5
has strong spiritual and religious roots.
These principles may have an alien, almost utopian ring, for current generations which have experienced a world far different from
that in which these principles were established. Each year6
[parents find their] children drawn off to great schools of unprecedented magnitude and efficiency, conducted by a new caste of "educators," who seem every year to absorb a larger share of [their] income,
and to play a larger part in the direction of [their] children's lives.
While one might be tempted to draw a linear projection from this
state of affairs, and to share with the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska7 revulsion at the image of children assembled into barracks
at seven years of age with their subsequent education and training
entrusted to official guardians,8 the picture is far more optimistic.

4. Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 I11.
303, 308 (1877). See also State ex rel.
Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (1891).
5. The championing of parental rights remains an enduring Catholic tradition.
Pope John XXIII reaffirmed in Pacem in Terris the venerable doctrine that 4'[p] arents
have the primary right to maintain and educate their own children." Quoted in Cortez,
Religious Liberty--The Rights of Parents in the Education of Their Children, II
CATH. LAW. 285, 291 (1965). Pius XII spoke in much stronger language when he
stated that "the school, influenced and controlled by the spirit of materialism, corrupts
and destroys what the parents have instilled in the minds of the children." Quoted in
Rooney, The Role of the Parent,4 CATH. LAW. 210, 213 (1958).
6. Gardner, Liberty, The State and the School, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 184,
189 (1955).
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
8. Id. at 402.
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With increasing frequency, the courts have forestalled, if not reversed,
this societal projection by rejecting the mechanistic and overly deferential view that "the rights of the parent in his child are just such
rights as the law gives him; no more, no less," 9 and by recognizing
that "[a] child is not a creature of the state. A child's first allegiance is
to his [or her] family and parental rights and responsibilities in the
education of children come before the state'."' 0 However irksome the
courts' more recent approach may seem to some educators, in the long
run it is salutary to the educational process and essential to the maintenance of our democratic institutions.
Wisconsin v. Yoder" is the most significant recent development
involving parental rights and state education. Respondents in Yoder,
members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative
Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's
compulsory attendance law which requires a child's school attendance
until age 16, and fined $5 each for refusing to send their children to
public or private school after they had graduated from the eighth
grade. Respondents claimed that application of the compulsory attendance law violated their rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. Attendance at high
school was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life, 12 and respondents believed that such attendance would expose themselves and
their children to criticism in the church community and endanger
their own salvation as well as that of their children.
Although the trial court found that the Wisconsin compulsory
school attendance law interfered with respondents' religious freedom,
it denied a motion to dismiss the criminal charges, concluding that the
requirement of high school attendance until age 16 was a reasonable
and constitutional exercise of the state's power. 13 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, reversed the convictions on the grounds that
respondents' first amendment rights had been infringed and that the
state had failed to prove that its interest in keeping these children in

9.

Allison v. Bryan, 21 Okla. 557, 97 P. 282, 286 (1908).

10.

Millikin v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457, 483 (1972).

11.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

12.

Id. at 210-11. Old Order Amish communities are characterized by the belief

that salvation requires life in a church community, in harmony with nature and the
soil. Id.
13. Id.at 213.
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school overrides respondents' right to free exercise of their religious
beliefs. 1 4 The Supreme Court of the United States agreed.
Wisconsin v. Yoder has injected new vitality into a complaint that
has been smouldering for decades, that the balance between state control and parental control over the education of children has tipped too
far in favor of the state. The thesis of this article is that this control is
being returned to parents, but with one crucial difference: While the
older cases found parental prerogatives in the interstices of statutes or
in their purposeful interpretation, the re-establishment of these same
prerogatives is being manifested on a constitutional basis, in the face of
clearly drawn statutes. The article will examine several areas where
this has occurred, a few where its occurrence is ripe, and will pause to
reflect on the rights of the children as the state and the parents
struggle for control over children and their education.
I.

COMPULSORY SECONDARY EDUCATION

Although compulsory elementary education is a relatively recent
development, 15 it has already sparked a good deal of criticism 16 and
litigation. It has been, however, unanimously, if not always persuasively, upheld. 1 7 By contrast, compulsory secondary education has fol-

14. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
15. Massachusetts enacted the first such law in 1852. Ch. 240, §§ 1, 2. 4 [18521 Mass.
Laws (now MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § I (Supp. 1973)). By 1896 such laws were
common in the northern and northwestern states, and were enacted in all southern
states by 1918. Woltz, supra note 1, at 4; see FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, OFFICE OF
EDUCATION, CIRCULAR No. 278, COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950 (1950).

AND

MINIMUM

16. Recent attacks by critics, see, e.g., I. ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (1970);
E. REIMER, SCHOOL IS DEAD (1971); J. HOLT, THE UNDERACHIEVING SCHOOL 71-79
(1969), serious questioning of its purpose and validity by government agencies, see,
e.g., ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SYMPOSIUM ON SERVICES
TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH-LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 1, 7-8 (1974), and the desire of
some states and counties to avoid racial integration by exempting some or all of their
children from compulsory (and in some cases all available) education have added new
fire to the running debate and promise to keep compulsory education a viable constitutional and policy issue in the years to come.
It should be noted that efforts to avoid integration by geographical exemptions to
compulsory education effected by closing integrated schools while leaving segregated
schools open has been invalidated as denying equal protection to both races. James
v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959). See also Griffin v. County School
Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 231 F. Supp.
743 (M.D. Ala. 1964); Allen v. County School Board, 207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va.
1962); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961).
17. Courts have often groped in their eagerness to uphold the validity of com-
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lowed a quiet course. Less than 60 years ago, the educational requirements of almost all states were satisfied by completion of the elementary grades, at least where the child was regularly and lawfully employed.18 Statutory imposition of several years of additional school
attendance was met with relatively infrequent litigation. Perhaps prospective litigants were convinced of the futility of challenging the
power of the state to compel attendance to any designated age, especially in light of the vague and sweeping reasons justifying compulsory
elementary education. 19
20
Indeed, one of the few precursors of Yoder was State v. Garber,
in which the facts were virtually identical to those of Yoder. 21 Amish
parents in Garber removed their children from public schools upon
completion of the eighth grade and provided the children vocational
and other instruction by a farmer/teacher designated by the Amish
community. The court held that removal of the children violated the
Kansas compulsory attendance statute because the legislature had
specifically eliminated home instruction as an alternative to instruction

in a "school" and the children were not in a "school" as defined by
statute.

22

pulsory education. For example, in State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901),
the court advanced the perfectly circular argument that children must attend school
because the state appropriates large sums of money in anticipation of all children
attending school
To carry out the enlightened and comprehensive system of education, enjoined
by the constitution of this state, a vast fund, dedicated exclusively to this purpose,
has been set apart. Revenues to the amount of $2,000,000 annually are distributed
among the school corporations of the state. No parent can be said to have the
right to deprive his child of the advantages so provided, and to defeat the purposes
of such munificent appropriations.
61 N.E. at 732. Some scholars still find such reasoning persuasive. See, e.g.,
K. ALEXANDER, R. CoRNs & W. MCCANN, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 539 (1969).

Other courts held constitutional compulgory education laws on the ground they aid
our military efforts, Shapiro v. Dorin, 199 Miic. 643, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830, 834-35 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1950), justify past military efforts, Knox v. O'Brien, 7 NJ. Super. 608, 72
A.2d 389, 391 (County Ct. 1950), prevent crime and foster equality, Shapiro v. Dorin,
supra, "protect the State," People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610, 613 (1927),
and "guard the general interest in youth's well being." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1943). Some courts simply conclude that states can pass such laws because they have the power to do so--result-oriented, but dispositive reasoning. See,
e.g., Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 P. 251, 253 (1892); Parr v. State, 117 Ohio St.
23, 157 N.E. 555, 556 (1927).
18. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,226 & n.15 (1972).
19. See note 17 supra.
20. 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966). See also Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa.
Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
21. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
22. 419 P.2d at 900.
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The contrast with the reasoning in Yoder is striking. The Supreme
Court in Yoder began by finding that the Amish parents clearly violated Wisconsin's compulsory attendance statute.2 3 This was not,
however, as in Garber, the end of the analysis. "[T] he fundamental
interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the...
education of their children, 2 4 combined with the free exercise of
religion claim, formed the basis of the Yoder Court's holding that
the Amish parents had a right to remove their children from public
school. Thus, the Yoder Court held that the parents' common law
right to direct their children's education, combined with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, displaces the compulsory
attendance statute, at least beyond the eighth grade.
Yoder, then, serves to reincarnate common law rights as constitutional rights even though such rights had seemingly been abolished by
statute. Without doubt, the Court placed great emphasis on the infringement of respondents' constitutional right to freedom of religion.
The Court noted the long history of the Amish as an identifiable religious sect and as a meaningful and self-sufficient segment of American
26
society. 25 The Court suggested:
[Courts] must move with great circumspection in performing the
sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious claims for exemption from generally
applicable educational requirements.
23. 406 U.S. at 207.
24. Id. at 232.
25. Id. at 235. The Pennsylvania Superior Court made similar note of the history
and contributions of the Amish community in upholding Pennsylvania's compulsory
education law against constitutional attack in Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super.
462, 79 A.2d 134 (195 1). Amish parents refused to send their children to public schools
beyond the eighth grade, but in contrast to Yoder and Garber, the parents apparently
did not provide their children an "alternative" form of education. The court concluded:
IT] here is no interference with religious liberty where the State reasonably restricts parental control, or compels parents to perform their natural and civic
obligations to educate their children. They may be educated in the public schools,
in private or denominational schools, or by approved tutors; but educated they
must be within the age limits and in the subjects prescribed by law.
79 A.2d at 137.
26. Id. The Court also found:
[The respondents had] convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious
beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that
belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish
communities and their religious organization, and the hazards merited by the
State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id.
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Nonetheless, the Court also based its decision on the fundamental interests of parents in their child's development. The interests of parent27
hood were clearly at stake in Yoder:
[T] his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted
with that of the State, to guide the religious- future and education of
their children. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.
The Court's recognition of the overriding interests of parenthood
comports with the common law developments previously discussed
and with the cases on which the Court relied.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2 8 for example, which involved a
statute requiring attendance in public schools until age 16, the Court
recognized a constitutional right of parents to send their children to
private, rather than public schools. 29 The Court stated that a "child is
not [a] mere creature of the state"; 30 the state has no right to "standardize its children. 3 1 The Court held that under the fourteenth
amendment the state may not unreasonably interfere with "the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
'32
children under their control.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,3 3 also relied on by the Yoder Court, a
statute forbidding the teaching of foreign languages in private schools
27. 406 U.S. at 232. These rights were again stressed by the Court in Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972): "The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
'essential,' ... 'basic civil rights of man,' ... and' [r ights far more precious ... than
property rights'...." Both Yoder and Stanley echo Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924), in which the Court recognized the right of parents to direct
the upbringing and education of their children. See text accompanying notes 28-32
infra.
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
29. Both the private schools in Pierce, one with a program devoted to the secular
and religious education and care of children,, and the other a military academy for
boys aged 5 to 21, provided a curriculum which paralleled that in the Oregon public
schools. The school administrators claimed their institutions were threatened with
destruction by the state's public school attendance law which exercised unwarranted
compulsion over present and prospective patrons of their schools. Id. at 535.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 534-35.
33. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
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was held unconstitutional. The Meyer Court reasoned that the legislature had unconstitutionally attempted "to interfere with the calling of
modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of
34
their own."
The full impact of the expansion of these principles in Yoder is yet
35
to be felt. Although the Court attempted to limit Yoder to its facts,
it recognized broad parental powers which may be restricted only in
36
certain vaguely defined instances:
To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation .. . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
have a potential for significant social burdens.
Thus, contrary to its practice in earlier cases such as Garber, the
Yoder Court found that the existence of a statute merely serves to
raise issues rather than resolve them. 37 Moreover, where fundamental
parental interests are involved, statutes or administrative actions will
be subject to "strict scrutiny" and the normal judicial deference to legislative enactments will not apply. 38 This shift acquires added significance in the other areas of parent-state confficts concerning the control of children and their education.
II.

THE PARENT'S RIGHT TO EDUCATE A CHILD AT
HOME
Although there are numerous cases which deal with the right of a

34. Id. at 401.
35. 406 U.S. at 234-36.
36. Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added).
37.
In light of the convincing showing by the Amish parents of their fundamental
interest in the upbringing and education, religious or otherwise, of their children, the
Court concluded:
[W]eighing the minimal difference between what the State would require and
what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show with more
particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be
adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.
406 U.S. at 236.
38. Compare 406 U.S. at 221, 224 with San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,40-43 (1972).

630

Parental Rights
parent to remove a child from the public schools and educate the
child at home, each case has been resolved by careful, sometimes tortured, readings of state statutes rather than by constitutional adjudication. This is somewhat remarkable in light of the closely related constitutional holding in Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 9 that parents have a
right to provide an equivalent education for their children in a privately operated school of the parents' choice, 40 and in light of the fact
that the key issues of the state courts' statutory debates have been
identical to those in Pierce, whether the home education is "equivalent" and whether it is taking place in a "school." In the wake
of Yoder, a constitutionally-based decision on the question of a parent's right to educate his or her child at home should be imminent.
It is propitious, then, to review the existent state authorities and suggest a constitutional resolution of this question.
A. The Case Law
The central issue in most home instruction cases is whether children
educated at home are receiving an education in a "school" as contemplated by the particular state statute involved. The Illinois Supreme
Court in People v. Levisen4 ' adopted a common sense approach to
this issue. The relevant statute in Levisen compelled school attendance
for children between 7 and 16, but allowed parents the choice of sending their children to a public, private or parochial school. Defendants,
who were unlicensed teachers, were convicted of violating the statute
for refusing to send their 7-year-old daughter to an acceptable school.
They did, however, provide five hours' instruction per day to their
daughter who had demonstrated a proficiency comparable to the average third grade student. 4 2 On appeal, the state supreme court reversed
the conviction and held that the child was indeed being educated in a
"private school." The statute did not, as the court read it, require that
a certain number of students attend in order to find that a school
existed. Despite the fact that the Illinois Legislature had recently re-

39.
40.

268 U.S. 510 (1924).
Id.

41,
42.

404 I11. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950).
90 N.E.2d at 214.
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pealed a provision expressly allowing home education, 43 the court
44
stated:
The object [of the statute] is that all children shall be educated, not
that they shall be educated in any particular manner or place ....

We

think the term "private school," when read in the light of the manifest
object to be attained, includes the place and nature of the instruction
given to this child.
Contrary to the Illinois court in Levisen, the Washington courts
have followed a highly curious course in addressing the issue of home
education. In 1912, the Washington Supreme Court held in State v.
Counort45 that a fully qualified and experienced teacher could not
teach his children at home because he was not operating a "school"
within the meaning of the state's compulsory attendance law. The
court reasoned that defendant's program was not sufficiently "institutional":46 A school, stated the court, is a "regular, organized and existing institution making a business of instructing children of school
age in the required studies and for the full time required by the laws
of this state."'47 Nonetheless, the court did not eliminate the possibility
that a more institutionally-minded parent might satisfy the statutory
requirements with home education: 48
Undoubtedly a private school may be maintained in a private home in
which the children of the instructor may be pupils. This provision of
the law is not to be determined by the place where the school is maintained, nor the individuality or number of the pupils who attend it. It

is to be determined by the purpose, intent, and character of the endeavor. The evidence of the state was to the effect that appellant
maintained no school at his home; that his two little girls could be
seen playing about the house at all times during the ordinary school
hours .... Appellant seemed to be impressed with the belief that, if
he was a competent and qualified teacher and gave instruction to his
children at home, he maintained a private school within the meaning
of the law. Such is not compliance with the law.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 to -9 (1971); see 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 105
(1950). In State v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963) and State v. Garber,
197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), the parents' claims were denied on this ground
alone.
44. 90 N.E.2d at 215.
45. 69Wash. 361, 124 P. 910(1912).
46. Id. at363-64, 124 P. at911-12.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 364. 124 P. at 912.
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It is unclear whether the deficiency in Counort's program of instruction was that he failed to keep the children at their studies for sufficient hours, to keep them indoors during school hours, to charge for
his services, or all three.
The Washington court has recently made it even more difficult for
one to offer home instruction that will comply with the statutory requirements by further elaboration on the meaning of "school." In
Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior Court,49 the court held
that a "school" requires a teacher and that a "qualified" teacher must
possess a teaching certificate from the state. Since the parents who
were conducting the home education program in Shoreline were not
certificated, the court held they were not operating a "school" within
50
the meaning of the compulsory attendance statute.
The Shoreline court's conclusion that parents in home instruction
situations must be certificated served to disqualify every noncredentialed private school teacher in Washington, despite the absence of
legislative standards governing private schools in the state. 51 Other
states have declined to follow Shoreline and have disqualified uncredentialed parents only in the face of more specific legislative guidance
preserving the right of noncredentialed instructors to teach in private
schools. 52 On the other hand, at least two other states have accepted
and applied a more reasonable rationale for Shoreline, mentioned in
passing by the court, 53 that the absence of statutorily required registration and approval of a home as a private school is an adequate
basis for denying the parents' claim that they are operating a
54
"school."
The New Jersey court, in Knox v. O'Brien,55 reviewed a statute
which permitted a child to attend a "day school in which there is
given instruction equivalent to that provided in the public schools...
49. 55 Wn. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960).
50. Id. at 182, 346 P.2d at 1002.
51. Id.
52. See State v. Massa, 95 NJ. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (County Ct. 1967); In re
Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1961); People v.
Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972
(1954); Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 244, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948). But see Knox v.
O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (County Ct. 1950).
53. 55 Wn. 2d at 183-84, 346 P.2d at 1003.
54.
State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170, 171-72 (1929); Commonwealth v.
Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109 (1955).

55.

7 N.J. Super. 608,72 A.2d 389 (County Ct. 1950).
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or to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere .
5..."56
The court interpreted the word "equivalent" to require that teacher qualifications and
teaching materials in private schools be identical to those in public
schools so as to provide the "full advantages supplied by the public
schools." Although the parent in Knox possessed a college degree in
education, teaching experience and state certification in secondary
education, her qualifications were held insufficient because she did not
possess grammar school credentials and lacked knowledge of "new
technics and methods" of teaching. 57 The court also held that even
though four children and another couple lived in the home where the
instruction was offered, such instruction was not "education equivalent to that provided in public schools" since the children had not had
an opportunity to become acquainted with other children and therefore did not have the full advantages of a school education.5 8 One
questions whether the court would have reached a different conclusion had the parents periodically taken the children to a playground at
a time when they could have met other children or if the children had
chanced to have friends in the neighborhood.
The "qualifications" issue was not present, however, in the New Jersey court's analysis in State v. Massa.5 9 Mrs. Massa had no teaching
certificate, but the state stipulated that she needed none, arguably conceding that Knox was at least half wrong. The court then rejected the
"social development" theory of Knox, stating that it was utterly unsupported in the statute, and that if such a theory were adopted, one
could never be educated outside of an institutional setting-a result
clearly contrary to legislative intent. 60
Courts supporting compulsory school attendance have suggested
that while noninstitutional education may be as efficacious as institutional education, it is more difficult and/or more expensive for state
inspectors to determine whether the children are being adequately
educated and that noninstitutional attendance should therefore be
banned. 6 1 This argument proceeds on the basis that a parent may

56. 72 A.2d at 390.
57. Id. at 392. The instructor's materials were approved without extended comment.
58. id.
59. 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (County Ct. 1967).
60. 231 A.2d at 255.
61. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953), appeal
dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170, 172 (1929).
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"make use of units of education so small, or facilities of such doubtful
quality, that supervision thereof would impose an unreasonable
burden upon the state ....
This assertion is of questionable validity since its acceptance would
probably result in placement of these children in public schools where
the state would bear the entire cost of their education, rather than just
the cost of evaluating it. Assuming that the state has a legitimate interest in assuring that its children develop a certain proficiency in such
subjects as reading, writing, arithmetic and civics, their "progress" in
these subjects could easily be measured by the ubiquitous, if obnoxious, standardized tests. 63 Administering such periodic tests would not
create an undue hardship for state employees or cost more than the
administration of such tests for institutionally educated children.
Moreover, the state should not have the slightest interest in the home's
educational "facilities," so long as the children are adequately educated. In fact, many well-known educational critics argue cogently
that the "facilities" and other trappings of institutional education have
such a stiffing effect upon the intellect, creativity and natural curiosity
of many children, that such facilities are rather to be shunned than
64
made universal.
B.

ConstitutionalConcern

Efficiency and expense are often sacrificed in support of our pluralistic society. The right of parents to decline to delegate the task of
shaping the minds of their children to a state institution demands precedence over a claim of administrative inconvenience. The state's in-

62.

263 P.2d at 687-88.

64.

See, e.g., ILLICH, supra note 16, at 1-24; REIMER, supra note 16, at 9. See also

63. Kansas followed this procedure by requiring parochial school students to pass
an examination before entering high school; public school children were exempt from
the examination. This practice was upheld in Creyhon v. Parson Board of Education,
99 Kan. 824, 163 P. 145 (1917). California requires students at unaccredited law
schools to take a "baby bar exam" upon completion of their first year of study to judge
whether they are receiving an adequate legal education. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060
(g) (West 1974). In addition, colleges such as the University of Southern California
are participating in "CLEP" (College Level Equivalency Project) in which students
receive up to two years of college credit for knowledge acquired outside of school if
they can demonstrate that knowledge in an examination. Phone interview with Dr.
Seymour Grietzer, President, Glendale College of Law, February 4, 1975.
R. MASTERS, WHY EDUCATION FAILS (1974).
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terest in requiring institutional instruction, rather than adequate instruction, cannot be said to outweigh "the right of parents to have
their children taught where, when, how, what, and by whom they may
judge best, . . . liberties guaranteed by section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. '65 Stated another
way:

66

The object of a compulsory education law is to see that children are
not left in ignorance, that from some source they will receive instruction that will fit them for their place in society. Provided the instruction given is adequate and the sole purpose is not to evade the statute,
instruction given to a child at home by its parent, who is competent to
teach, should satisfy the requirements of the compulsory education
law.
It is submitted that the distinctions between what is or is not a
"school" and what educational "facilities" are or are not provided are
of no real consequence. The state should be concerned only with
whether the instruction provided a child is adequate. The right of parents to send their children to a private school cannot be nullified by
eccentric state statutes or statutory construction defining what constitutes a "school."
lII.

REMOVING CHILDREN FROM PARTICULAR CLASSES

Yoder can be expected to revitalize a host of older and, until recently, obscure cases granting parents the right to remove their children from certain classes and the study of certain subjects. Although
many common law cases hold this right to be plenary, the few cases
which have analyzed this issue on a constitutional basis limit this
right to classes not essential to good citizenship.
A typical example of the common law right of a parent to remove a
child from a given class is Morrow v. Wood. 67 The parent in that case
objected to the requirement that his child study geography. The court
65. People v. Stanley, 81 Colo.276. 255 P. 610, 613 (1927).
66. People v. Turner, 277 App. Div. 317, 98 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (1950). See also
Commonwealth v. Roberts. 159 Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402 (1893): Bevin v. Shears.
[191112 K.B. 936.

67. 35 Wis. 59 (1874). See also Trustees of Schools v. People ex rel. Van Allen
87 Ill.
303 (1877): Rulison v. Post. 79 111. 567 (1875).
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upheld the parent's right to remove the child from geography class in
68
the most forceful language:
Whence did the teacher derive this exclusive and paramount authority over the child, and the right to direct his studies contrary to the
wish of the father? It seems to us it is idle to say the parent, by sending
his child to school, impliedly clothes the teacher with that power, in a
case where the parent expressly reserves th& right to himself, and refuses to submit to the judgment of the teacher the question as to what
studies his boy should pursue.
These older cases arguably may be distingushed on the ground that
attendance was not yet compulsory.6 9 Moreover, most modern cases
involve subjects in which statutes require instruction.
A.

Development of a ConstitutionalRight

There are several cases, however, upholding a parent's right to
remove a child from a class where both education and the classes in
question are compulsory. In State ex rel. Sheibley v. School District
No. 1,70 the Nebraska Supreme Court analyzed a statute which
granted to school trustees the power to "cause [the children] to be
taught in such schools and departments as they may deem expedient
[and] ... to prescribe courses of study ....-71 A father objected to
his child's study of grammar for the sole reason that it was not taught
as it was when he attended school.7 2 The court held that the father
possessed the right to excuse his child from the study of grammar because the teacher, unlike the father, has a "mere temporary interest in
her welfare" and the father knows better the physical and mental ca73
pabilities of his child. The father may know, for example,
that all the prescribed course of studies is more than the strength of
the child can undergo, or he may be desirous, as is frequently the case,
that his child.., should also take lessons in music, painting, etc., from
private teachers. This he has a right to do.
68. 35 Wis. at 65.
567 (1875). Compulsory attendance laws
69. See, e.g., Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill.
were not commonplace until 1896. See note 15 supra.
70. 31 Neb. 552,48 N.W. 393 (1891).
71. 48 N.W. at 394.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Of particular note in the case is that, however correct the principles
expressed, the father shared none of the court's reasons for excluding
his child, and indeed had no objection to the manner of instruction in
grammar, other than its antiquity. 74 The case, nevertheless, is important because it contains the first suggestion of constitutional issues
surrounding the right of a parent to remove a child from a class. The
court stated that any rule or regulation which required a child to continue in a prescribed branch of study contrary to the desire of the
'75
parent would be "arbitrary and unreasonable.
This constitutional theme was further developed in the same state 23
years later in State v. Ferguson,7 6 in which the court, upholding
77
the parent's right to excuse his child from music class, stated:
The public school is one of the main bulwarks of our nation, and we
would not knowingly do anything to undermine it; but we should be
careful to avoid permitting our love for this noble institution to cause
us to regard it as "all in all" and destroy both the God-given and constitutional right of a parent to have some voice in the bringing up and
education of his children .... [W] e want to be careful lest we carry
the doctrine of governmental paternalism too far, for, after all is said
and done, the prime factor in our scheme of government is the American home .... [School authorities] should not too jealously assert
or attempt to defend their supposed prerogatives.
School authorities, however, have been reluctant to surrender any of
their "supposed prerogatives." They have argued that permitting parents to excuse pupils from particular classes would destroy the discipline, efficiency and general well-being of the schools. The authorities'
protests, however, were commonly found to be more a Pavlovian re78
sponse than the product of demonstratable facts.

74. Contra, State ex rel. Andrew v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N.E. 708, 712-13
(1886). In Andrew, a parent's attempt to remove his child from a class was denied
because the parent lacked a rational objection to his child's presence in the class.
75. 48 N.W. at 394.
76. 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914).
77.
144 N.W. at 1043-44.
78. Id. See also School Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578
(1909). See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist..
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, if the parent insisted that every child be removed
from a given class, the request would properly be denied for lack of standing. See
Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949):
Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970).
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B.

The Good Citizenship Rule

The two most important cases in this area, decided in the 1920's,
are strikingly similar to Yoder and provide a useful template for future adjudication. In the first case, Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees,7 9 a parent who was morally opposed to dancing refused to permit his children to participate in dance classes and the children were
therefore expelled from school. The California Supreme Court, in no
uncertain terms, reversed the expulsions and upheld the right of the
parent to withdraw his children from the dance class:8 0
[T] he important proposition involved in this controversy . . . is a
question of morals and the liberty of conscience upon a subject upon
which people have the natural and constitutional right to hold and put
into practice divergent opinions .... It also involves the right of parents to control their own children-to require them to live up to the
teachings and the principles which are inculcated in them at home
under the parental authority and according to what the parents themselves may conceive will be the course of conduct in all matters which
will the better and more surely subserve the present and future welfare
of their children .... Has the state the right to enact a law or confer
upon any public authorities a power the effect of which would be to
alienate in a measure the children from parental authority? . . . [T] o
answer... in the affirmative would be to give sanction to a power over
home life that might result in denying to parents their natural as well
as their constitutional right to govern or control, within the scope of
just parental authority, their own progeny....
Under Hardwick, this parental right would not, of course, dispose
of every case, for the views of the parents might be unreasonable or
harmful to the children or society, or the matters involved might
simply be none of their proper concern. 8 ' A rule of thumb was clearly
82
needed. That rule was supplied in People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley,
in which the Colorado Supreme Court first established, as a constitu83
tional premise, this proposition:

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49, 54 (1921).
205 P. at 54.
Id.
81 Colo. 276,255 P. 610 (1927).
Id. at 613-14.
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[T] he right of parents to select, within limits, what their children shall
learn, is one of the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the national Constitution, and of which, therefore, no state can deprive them.
84
The limits of this rule were expressed as follows:

[P] arents . . . can refuse to have [their children] taught what they
think harmful, barring what must be taught; i.e., the essentials of good
citizenship.
The Stanley court concluded that the subject under consideration.,
biology, was not essential to the functioning of a citizen in society and
upheld the right of the parent to excuse his child from the biology
class.
The "good citizenship" standard in Stanley assumes that the interest
of the state in imposing compulsory education is to provide all citizens with the knowledge essential to function in society. "Nonessential" learning cannot be compelled over parental objections. 85
The Supreme Court in Yoder based its holding on similar rea86
soning. In summing up the record, the court stated:
The record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious
objections of the Amish . . . will not impair the physical or mental
health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to
discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other
way materially detract from the welfare of society.
The Court stressed the "speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship, from an additional one or two years of compulsory
formal education,"8 7 and the fact that the Amish are "capable of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without

compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade.

. .

"88

Even Thomas

84.

Id. at 613 (emphasis added).

85.

In Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 104 Neb. 93,

175 N.W. 531, 534 (1917), rev'd on other grounds, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1922), the court stated:

The state should control the education of its citizens far enough to . . . insure
that they understand the nature of the government under which they live, and
are competent to take part in it. Further than this, education should be left to the
full freedom of the individual.

86.
87.
88.
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Jefferson, noted the Court, was only concerned with a basic education
when he called education a "bulwark of a free people against tyr89
anny."
The question remains as to precisely what knowledge is essential to
enable children to fulfill the "social and political responsibilities of citizenship." The result in Stanley, measured against the test of essential
knowledge, seems clearly correct, since many, if not most, citizens
forget the bulk of what is learned about biology, for instance, without
perceptible disability to their conduct as citizens. 9 0 Under the same
rubric, elementary mathematics could be required, although calculus
could not; handwriting could be required, creative writing could not.
In any event, when the state chooses to override a parent's wishes, the
burden is on the state to establish that in order to function effectively
as a citizen one must be versed in the subject to which the parent objects. Nor will a perceptive court allow the academician to retreat into
abstraction by claiming the virtues of a given subject-matter as fostering "well-roundedness" or "the ability to think." Finally, assuming
the state has unequivocally demonstrated an interest in compelling the
study of a given subject, this should not establish its concurrent interest in having the subject taught by a given teacher or in a given
school, at a given time or by a given method.
C.

Values v. Facts

When "public education actively attempts to shape a child's personal development in a manner chosen not by the child or by his [or
her] parents but by the state," 9 ' the question then becomes not what
the child should know, but whether the state has a right to influence
the child's values contrary to those of the parents. This, in fact, was
the complaint of the parents in Yoder. High school instruction, they

89. Id.
90. Indeed, a good deal of the effort of education might be questioned solely on
the basis of the rapidity with which data, especially meaningless, irrelevant data, is
forgotten. See G. KIMBLE & N. GARMEZY, PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 238-40
(2d ed. 1963); F. SANFORD, PSYCHOLOGY 388-89 (2d ed. 1966). Moreover, it would

be difficult for the schools to confidently predict the essentiality of any knowledge in
the world the children will inhabit as adults. J. HOLT, THE UNDERACHIEVING SCHOOL
171-76, 193-94 (1969).
91. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 619
(1971).
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contended, contains a "hidden" curriculum which "tends to emphasize
intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students."9 2 In
contrast: 93
Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of
"goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition; and
separation from, rather than integration with, contemporary worldly
society.
The Court properly resolved the issue by deciding that the parent's
value system demanded precedence over the state's substantive program.
Often the value-content and the subject-content of classroom instruction are inextricably intertwined. This is especially true when the
state attempts to cure social ills through compulsory attendance of
children at various presentations and classes. Sometimes the required
classes are designed to impart values with which few parents would
quarrel, at least in the abstract. A California statute, for example,
requires instruction in "the principles of morality, truth, justice...
[and] kindness toward domestic pets . . . ," and the avoidance of
"idleness, profanity and falsehood." 9 4 Other times, however, as in
Yoder, the values imparted are vigorously opposed by parents.
Where the state refuses to separate the attempt to mold the child's
values from the teaching of facts, the parents clearly have a right to
remove their children from the class. For example, in Valent v. New
Jersey State Board of Education,95 a case involving compulsory sex
96
education, the court asked:

92. 406 U.S. at 211.
93. Id.
94. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13556.5 (West 1975).
95. 114 N.J. Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971).
96. 274 A.2d at 839. Several states have solved this problem by providing by
statute that parents may remove their children from such portions of classes in health.
sex, family life and venereal disease instruction as conflict with the parent's moral
convictions, see, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8506, 8507, 8701 (West 1975), and a few
have even restricted asking children about their or their parents' personal practices or
beliefs relating to sex, family life, morality and religion. See, e.g., id. § 10901. It is
clear, however, that parents cannot demand that the children of nonobjecting parents
be excused from educational practices or subjects they condemn. Medeiros v. Kiyosaki.
52 Hawaii 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970) (sex education).
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Is the State, through the educational system, permitted to encroach
upon the patterns and molding of a child's behavior in personal, family or religious beliefs? Parental discipline, authority and respect
diminish as the great sovereign state forces its way into the home as a
foster parent. Some parents may be happy to be relieved of the obligation and responsibility. Others may feel that the constant eroding of
their usefulness as parents portends great danger, and youth will look
to the state, rather than the parent, for guidance.
IV.

SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION

Beyond the questions of essential knowledge and instruction in values, there is the issue of the physical well-being of the child. Courts
have recognized the right of parents to remove their child from a dangerous school in the face of the compulsory education laws. For example, in In re Richards,97 the New York Supreme Court held that it
was not unreasonable for a parent to refuse to permit a child under 16
years of age to walk 1 miles along a lonely, poorly maintained and
unfenced road to the school bus stop.9 8 More recently, in In re Foster,99 a New York court allowed parents, despite the traditional
vesting of the placement power in school administrators, to remove
two children from one school and place them in another over school
board objections, because the children had been beaten at the school
of attendance.
In School District v. Zebra,100 all of the students graduating from
Concord Elementary School, in Pittsburgh, were sent to Knoxville
Junior High, in Pittsburgh, where they comprised a racial minority.
Soon thereafter there were numerous and repeated incidents of physical violence.' 0 ' Some parents removed their children from the school

97.

255 App. Div. 922, 7 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1938).

98. 7 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
99. 69 Misc. 2d 400, 330 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1972).
100. 4 Pa. C. 642, 287 A.2d 870 (1972).
101. 287 A.2d at 871-73. The court provided detailed descriptions of a number

of illustrative incidents of stabbings with scissors, beatings, extortion and other physical
and mental abuse. One I 1-year-old boy, "while waiting in the hall for the school bus,
had a cup of human urine thrown upon him by another student. He observed children
being beaten in the halls, thrown down steps and having money taken from them, all
of which took place in front of teachers who did nothing to stop or prevent such
happenings." Many children, the court noted, testified:
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and sought an injunction against enforcement of the compulsory education laws, based upon the irreparable harm which would occur to
the children until their physical and mental well-being could be fully
protected. A preliminary injunction was granted. The school board
assigned the children to other schools for the balance of the year, but
continued the legal fight.
Six months later the case was back in the trial court.10 2 The court
reiterated its finding that the school board had failed to provide the
children with an environment in which they could obtain an education
without an adverse effect on their health, safety and general welfare.
The court noted that since the preliminary injunction, the situation at
Knoxville had deteriorated and therefore entered a permanent injunction.
Two months later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.10 3 At
the outset of its discussion, the court acknowledged the problems at
Knoxville, and more importantly, stated that it could not be denied
"that a parent is justified in withdrawing his [or her] child from a
school where the health and welfare of the child is threatened," despite the compulsory education law and demands by the local board
that they be sent to unsafe schools.10 4 Nevertheless, the court concluded, for technical and questionable reasons, that an injunction was
05
an improper remedy in this case. 1

[T] hey were too frightened to report incidents to school officials and ... they were
threatened with bodily harm if they did so. The record indicates clearly that threats
of beatings were commonplace if plaintiffs' children failed to give money to their
tormentors or had the courage to report specific incidents to their teachers.
Id. at 873.
The court stressed that the issues at bar were not bussing (bussing would be
necessary regardless of where the students were sent) nor racial integration (for no
objections were ever raised on that ground to Knoxville).
102. 41 U.S.L.W. 2167 (Sept. 14, 1972).
103. 449 Pa. 432, 296 A.2d 748 (1972).
104. 296 A.2d at 751.
105. Id. The court found the injunction improper on four grounds: (1) it applied
to 47 students although there was evidence of incidents involving only I1: (2) the
incidents in question occurred a month prior to the hearing on the injunction, additional personnel had since been sent to the school to promote safety, and the parents
failed to demonstrate that the conditions had not already been corrected: (3) the board
of education was not threatening enforcement of the compulsory education laws.
pending determination of the case, and therefore the injunction was unnecessary; and
(4) an injunction issued without a showing of bad faith, abuse of discretion or
illegality would unduly interfere with the right of the board to assign students where
it wished. Id. at 752.
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In a Philadelphia case, Bichrest v. School District,10 6 a federal district court suggested that parents might bring an action under the

Civil Rights Act of 1871107 against school officials for specified acts
committed in their private capacities for the cost of private school tuition if the child were assigned to and subsequently removed from an
unsafe school. An action against the school board itself, however,
would not lie, as the board is not a "person" within the contemplation
08
of the Act.'

The court's reasoning is questionable. If the evidence did not justify relief for all
the students, this might have been grounds for modifying the injunction, but not for
invalidating it. Why, in any case, should every parent have to wait until his or her
child is hurt before seeking safeguards? The trial court's specific finding that the
situation had deteriorated after the injunction was granted was not mentioned by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Furthermore, once the parents had demonstrated a
right to relief, the burden of proving the situation had changed clearly lay with the
school board, especially since the parents had no access to data concerning conditions
at the school after their children had been removed. In addition, a more pacific
atmosphere at the school might simply have indicated that the Concord children, the
objects of the violence, were no longer available to attack.
The notion that the school board's forbearance to prosecute pending determination
of the case is a reason for denying the injunction is truly paradoxical; a decision by the
state court of last resort itself terminates the case and leaves the school board free to
prosecute. It is also clear that the parents were in fact after a ruling in the nature of a
declaratory judgment. The controversy was ripe for adjudication; it is manifestly unfair
to force the parents to subject themselves to criminal prosecution before being allowed
to vindicate their rights.
By indicating that the lower courts had interfered with the right of the board to
assign pupils, the court was apparently referring to the part of the injunction which
directed the board to transfer the children to another school. If so, the court's
decision demands three conclusions: (I) the board was empowered to make an unsafe
assignment; (2) the parents had a right to refuse to send their children to the school
designated by the board; and (3) the children, having no powers or rights, were
deprived of an education. In any event, as the intermediate court noted, the interference
with the board's assignment power was minimal because the board was free to transfer
the children to any school fit for their attendance.
The alternative interpretation of this ground for the court's holding-that the board,
pursuant to its power of assignment, could force the children to attend Knoxville
despite the danger-is nonsensical. Such a reading cannot be reconciled with the
admitted right of the parent to remove the child from an unsafe school, which right
was deemed superior to the compulsory education laws. In addition, the parents were
not protesting the assignment of their children to Knoxville or any other school; they
were protesting being forced to send their children to any school so long as it is
unsafe. Their claim would have been identical had the same conditions existed in any
other school in the district.
106. 346 F. Supp. 249, 252-53 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
108. 346 F. Supp. at 251. Section 1983 gives a claim to the injured party only
against a "person who ... subjects ... any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970).
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PARENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SCHOOL PRACTICES

The discussion thus far has focused on the right of parents to refuse
to send their children to school, or if they do send them, to remove
their children from objectionable classes or unsafe schools. These
remedies are, of course, extreme, and it would be unfortunate if parents could only vindicate their right to protect their children and control their upbringing by depriving the children of state-supported educational opportunities. Indeed, several school districts have argued that
if parents find the public schools unacceptable in any respect, their
remedy is to send their children to a private school more consonant
with their philosophy. The courts, however, have rejected this "love it
or leave it" argument the few times it has been advanced. 109
Courts rejecting the argument have reasoned that the right of a
parent to control a child's upbringing is, as has been previously discussed,' 10 a constitutionally protected right. The state may not condition enjoyment of the statutorily vested right to a state-supported education on surrender of the parent's right of control."' There is also an
2
equal protection objection to the "love it or leave it" argument: "
[I] s the right of parents to guide the education of their children confined to those parents who can afford to send their children to parochial or private schools? Have the parents of children who must for
financial or other reasons attend the public schools no right to guide
the education of their children ... ?
It is clear that "the Court's special concern for educational freedom in
the Pierce case easily implies a corresponding concern for the child

109. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1962)
(Brennan, J., concurring); People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P.
610, 614 (1927).
110. See Part I supra.
11l.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610, 614
(1927). See generally Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 879
(1929); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 321 (1955). As Justice Brennan, concurring in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 242 (1962), noted, students have the right to attend public school and
the right to attend private school. "[T] he First Amendment forbids the State to inhibit
that freedom of choice by diminishing the attractiveness of either alternative . . ."
112. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3 (1949).
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whose family condition makes the exercise of that freedom impossi13
ble.1$'
Finally, the "love it or leave it" argument has no rational bounds
and is antithetical to any constitutionally based decision. For example,
rather than vindicating the wearing of armbands in school, the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,114 could have advised the children to attend a private
school where the authorities permit the wearing of armbands.
Recent cases shed some light on the right of parents to exempt their
children from pedigogical and disciplinary methods of which they disapprove without resorting to removal of their children from school. In
Glaser v. Marietta,1 15 a federal district court upheld the constitutionality of corporal punishment, but also established the right of a
parent to forbid school authorities from using corporal punishment on
his or her child. Based on Yoder and related cases, the court held that
116
Mrs. Glaser's "parental right to raise her son as she thinks proper
is a fundamental right which the school district had not, on the facts
presented, counterbalanced.
Glaser is one of the first post-Yoder cases to apply a balancing test
which calls upon the schools to defer to the wishes of parents unless
that decision "will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have
a potential for significant social burdens.""117 It also highlights the additional standing of the parents, as opposed to the child, to obtain judicial intervention in a wide range of school decisions. Even where no
constitutional right is otherwise involved, the fact that a parent is
making the request in itself mandates a constitutional analysis of the
question and requires that a heavy burden be placed on school authorities in seeking to counterbalance the parent's constitutional right.
In Breen v. Kahl,"1 8 for example, the school board claimed that it was
"in loco parentis" and therefore had the power to forbid long hair on

113. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity:A Workable Constitutional Test for State FinancialStructures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 388 (1969).
114. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
115. 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972).

116. Id. at 559. The court also relied on Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
117. 406 U.S. at 234.
118. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
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students. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected this
argument in large measure because the parents agreed with the children on the question of their grooming, and there was, therefore, no
delegation of authority to the school board.' 19
A related constitutional claim, one which seems to emanate more
from fourth and ninth amendment privacy rights than from a fourteenth amendment claim of infringement of liberty, is that a school
practice may not invade the "private realm of family life." Justice
120
Rutledge wrote in Prince v. Massachusetts:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder ....

And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have

respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
Thus, when a school administered personality tests to students in
order to identify potential drug abusers, it was held that the parent's
12 1
right to privacy concerning family matters had been violated.

119. As was noted in State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, 543 (1971),
affd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the related doctrine of
parens patriae has fallen on hard times since its indictment in In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967). Several other cases have likewise refused to apply the in loco parentis
doctrine where a parent refuses to delegate authority to the school. See, e.g., Church
v. Board of Educ., 339 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F.
Supp. 728, 734 n.19 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874). See
generally Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interests, 61 ILL. BAR. J. 638,
639 (1973).
Going beyond the Glaser and Breen cases, the court in Johnson v. Horace Mann
Mutual Ins. Co., 241 So. 2d 588, 591 (La. 1970), commented:
It might have been said, in days when schooling was a voluntary matter, that
there was an implied delegation of such authority from the parent to the school
and teacher selected by the parent. Such a voluntary educational system ... has
long since disappeared. Parents no longer have the power to choose either the
public school or the teacher in the public school. Without such power to choose,
it can hardly be said that parents intend to delegate the authority to administer
corporal punishment by the mere act of sending their child to school.
In such a case, the parent would not even be required to register disapproval, as in
Glaser or Breen. Of course, in many states the power to administer corporal punishment rests on statutory enactment, see, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10854 (West 1975),
rather than on implied delegation of parental authority, and the Yoder/Glaser balancing
analysis would be required.
120. 321 U.S. 158, 166(1944).
121. Merrikin v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 918-19 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Although
the parents agreed to the test in this case, the court held the waiver invalid, requiring
that both sides of the question and the consequences of the waiver must be explained.
California has a statute which substantially embodies the holding of Merrikin. CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 10901 (West 1975).
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Where a school attempted to restrict the attendance of students at social affairs, the domain of the parents was held invaded.' 22 The power
of the school to force students to study at home between designated
hours has also been denied as an attempt to displace parental authority. 12 3 The rationale behind these decisions has already been discussed.' 2 4 For example, in Valent v. New Jersey State Board of Education,1 25 the court held that compulsory sex education was an example of the state unacceptably forcing its way into the home as a
"foster parent" and establishing itself, in the parents' stead, as the
source of personal and moral guidance.
The "family privacy" rationale will, in most cases, be virtually indistinguishable from the "parental power" reasoning. The latter, however, may focus more closely on the issues involved as the state increasingly seeks to place upon overburdened teachers the task of
curing all social ills, on the theory that, given an immature and captive audience, "man can do what God cannot, namely, manipulate
others for their own salvation."' 2 6 While most such programs are relatively harmless and are distinguished mainly by the virtuous feeling
aroused in their sponsors and by the boredom of the captive audience,' 2 7 jealously guarding the right of parents to object to such programs and to excuse their children will provide a necessary check on
the zeal of the program developer. Finally, children whose parents are
sufficiently interested in their education to register such protests will
doubtless not suffer from a lack of personal or moral guidance.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As suggested by Justice Douglas in Yoder, 2 8 the controversies in

122.

Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 (1877); State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne, 32

Mo. App. 536 (1888).

123.

Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515 (1909).

124.
125.

See Part III-C supra.
114 NJ. Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971); see text

accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
126.
127.

Illich, supra note 16, at 50.
See generally Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive

Auditor, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 960 (1953).
128. 406 U.S. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Justice Douglas disagreed
with the Court's conclusion that the question of attendance beyond the eighth grade
was "within the dispensation of the parents alone" and that the issue of the rights of
the Amish children was not before the Court. Id. at 241. Douglas argued that if the
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this area sometimes resemble a vigorous tug-of-war between parents
and school authorities, with the child standing mutely in between.
Such a view, however, cannot be maintained in light of the rapidly
growing body of cases which attempt to settle disputes between the
suppliers and consumers of state education; controversies involving
parental rights comprise only a small (albeit a growing) number.
Moreover, the efforts of parents on their children's behalf is almost
invariably complementary, rather than contrary, to similar efforts by
their children. As a practical matter, children cannot effectively assert
their own rights beyond a certain point without the aid of their parents. Litigation to vindicate student rights, for example, is for the most
part impossible without such concurrence. 129 Finally, to the extent that
there is truth in the schools' assertion that children are "not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition
of [constitutional] guarantees,"1 30 i.e., that they do not know what is
best for them, their parents' traditional role as their champions is entirely appropriate.
As in so many areas of law, the natural tendency of the legislature
is to regulate; the natural tendency of school authorities, like all authorities, is to consolidate their power over their charges; and the constitutional obligation of courts is to restore basic values and freedoms
lost in this process. At a time when so many are urging parents to assume responsibility for the upbringing and actions of their children,
and are decrying the decay of the nuclear family, the increasing emergence of parents willing to resist exclusion from any effective
participation, beyond Parent-Teacher Association meetings, in the education of their children must be viewed as a hopeful sign.

child is mature enough to express desires which conflict with his parents, "it would
be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing
his views." Id. at 242. The daughter of one of the defendants had testified that her own
religious views were opposed to high school education. Id. at 243. As to the parent of
that child, Justice Douglas concurred in the Court's opinion, but he dissented as to the
other defendants since their children had not given testimony as to their views. Id.
129. See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969); Glaser v. Marietta,
351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Right of PrivacyPersonality Test Used by School to Identify Potential Drug Abusers Without Informed Consent of Parents Violates Student's and Parents' Right of Privacy, 27 VAND.
L. REv. 372, 380 (1974); Gardner, Liberty, the State, and the School, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 184, 185 (1955).
130. Ginzberg v. United States, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Parental Rights
As traditional parental rights continue to be restored, we can look
forward to the time when: 13
the directors of state-supported school systems recognize the priority
parents have in the educational process, and devote their best efforts to assisting the parents in their task instead of presuming to supersede them in
any degree, [and are therefore] able to make their purposes better understood, and thereby win ready cooperation from parents generally.
Only cooperation between parents and school authorities will best assure adoption of educational programs which will "most effectually
13 2
promote the child's welfare."'

131.
132.

Rooney, The Role of the Parent,4CATH. LAw. 210, 213 (1958).
303, 308 (1877).
Trustees of Schools v. People ex rel. Van Allen, 87 Ill.
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